The electoral competitiveness among candidates vying for single elected positions (e.g. president, members of parliament single member districts, or candidates for the party leadership) lacks an appropriate measurement. This study reevaluates previous measurements and proposes a new indicator that accounts for the interaction between the number of candidates and the distribution of votes. The resulting indicator overcomes the oversensitivity problem associated with earlier speci cation and provides better competitiveness estimate for various electoral settings. Its applicability is universal and allows for cross-cases and longitudinal comparisons for a wide variety of single-winner elections.
INTRODUCTION
Political competition lies at the heart of contemporary representative democracies. Its effects on a large number of electoral and political processes lead to a series of attempts to develop valid and reliable measures. Whereas the electoral competitiveness between political parties has been approached differently in various studies (Key 1949; Mayhew 1974; Ranney 1976; Bibby 1990; Przeworski 1991; Holbrook and van Dunk 1993; Vanhanen 1997; Hall 2001; Besley and Preston 2002; Bibby and Holbrook 2001) , considerable less attention has been devoted to the competition between individual candidates for a single post. A few examples of competitions falling in this category are the presidential and local elections (i.e. the mayor), elections in single member districts, or intra-party leadership selection.
When referring to competitiveness, Mayhew (1974) employed the margin between the two largest parties. Adapted to individual contexts, the competitiveness is re ected by the margin between the two main candidates. Similarly, the measurement proposed by Vanhanen (1997) for the electoral competition between political parties can be transposed in the setting of elections among individuals: the competitiveness is given by the share of the vote won by the most popular candidate. The major shortcoming of both indicators is that they ignore the number of candidates and the distribution of votes among candidates other than the  rst two in the case of Mayhew and the most popular candidate for Vanhanen. Two supplementary indicators were reviewed by Kenig (2009) : the incumbents' success rate and the likelihood of contests (direct coronations). Their weaknesses have been carefully revealed by the author: the incumbents' success rate refers only to contests in which incumbents participate and where challengers are formally organized, whereas the coronations differentiates between single-candidate and multi-candidate instances (Kenig 2009, 244-245) . To overcome these shortcomings, Kenig constructs an index -effective number of candidates (ENC) -based on the commonly used effective number of parties (ENP) index (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) . And he incorporates "the absolute number of candidates" (denoted by N) into the ENC formula as the denominator to re ect "the extent to which the number of candidates had shrunk" (electoral competitiveness) (Kenig 2009, 246) .
Although this is so far the most sophisticated solution to account for competition for a single post developed, as we will demonstrate shortly, simulation analysis suggests that this index suffers from sensitivity (to the number of candidates) and identi cation problem resulting from N's larger marginal effects and the upper bound limit imposed by Kenig's model speci cation. This article proposes a new competitiveness index that alleviates these problems and improves the estimation precision through more ef cient use of vote distribution in formation. Our competitiveness indicator is thus robust to and facilitates comparison of various kinds of electoral setting that involve different number of candidates and diverse vote distribution patterns in single-winner elections.
PROBLEMS WITH THE ENC/N INDEX
ENC/N is a decreasing function of the interaction term N * !V i 2 . Kenig added an N term to normalize his ENC index on a 0-1 scale with an aim to "re ect the distribution of votes and [will] neutralize the effect of the absolute number of candidates"; however, only scant attention is paid to the behavior of the marginal Sergiu Gherghina, Huan-Kai Tseng When Candidates and Vote Distribution Matter: A New Indicator of Electoral Competitiveness 57 effects of this interaction term when its two components, N and !V i 2 , are evaluated at the opposite extremes. Figure 1 shows how the curvature of the ENC/N index surface changes when !V i 2 and N are evaluated across their full range of values. 1 At higher levels of !V i 2 (higher concentration of votes in a few candidates), smaller N makes the ENC/N index more competitive, as exhibited in the quick "jump" in curvature in the direction of N when the absolute value of N falls under 2-a phenomenon which is empirically unsound. In addition, note that as !V i 2 approaches 0, the ENC/N index shoots up to its maximum value (1) regardless of the parameter value on the N-axis, as shown in the light-colored trapezoid-shape area in the upper right corner of this plot, causing identi cation problem in this area when one tries to compare the relative competitiveness among contests with different size of N. Apparently, Kenig's speci cation fails to achieve its intended purposes. We argue that these biases are rooted in the multiplicative nature of the ENC/N index's denominator term. First, recall that Kenig's ENC/N index is just the inverse of the multiplicative term N * !V i 2 ! i = 1,…, N. Theoretically speaking, as N increases, at the margin, it tends to pull votes away from major contenders because more candidates always present more alternatives for selectorates, which makes the distribution of votes less concentrated. According to Kenig (2009, 236) , a more equal distribution of votes would make the contests more competitive.
However, ENC/N is decreasing in both N and !V i 2 through the composite denominator term N * !V i 2 , and in Kenig's speci cation N is any integers " 2 while !V i 2 is bounded between 0 and 1, 2 it is easy to see that the marginal effect of N drives down the ENC/N score faster than !V i 2 . When we compare two elections with similar vote distribution patterns, the election with more fringe candidates will receive much lower ENC/N estimate owing to N's much larger diminishing marginal effect than that of !V i 2 . Even in instances with the same number of candidates the ENC/N index is slightly problematic as it is in uenced by the share of votes received by the winner. If this is small, then the index is large (see H 1 and H 4 ). Apart from this, his index is quite sensitive to the vote share received by small competitors and to the number of competitors (at the expense of difference between the  rst two candidates). A practical illustration of these shortcomings is re ected in the four hypothetical situations listed in Table 1 . Elections H 1 and H 2 illustrate this issue: the vote share difference between the  rst three candidates is similar, the share of the winner is smaller in H 1 ; At the same time, the share of the least popular candidate is higher. Consequently, H 1 's competitiveness index goes up. Elections H 3 and H 4 show how the index overestimates the diminishing marginal effect exerted by small competitors. The presence of fringe candidates signi cantly alters the competitiveness index. It is worth elaborating the identi cation problem outlined previously. This issue is related to Kenig's attempt to transform the unbounded ENC indicator into a bounded index. This is commendable because such treatment allows the ENC/N index of the same N-class to be well-behaved within the 0-1 scale, but it also constrains our ability to extend our competitiveness analysis of elections whose N(s) range across the full range of possible values. Some simple algebraic expressions might help clarify this issue. Suppose for a given election, votes are equally distributed among all N candidates, this election's ENC/N score is calculated as implying the maximum level of competitiveness. Note the maximum value is invariant to the size of N. Although Kenig acknowledged his ENC/N index "works to its best when the (absolute) number of candidates is equal" (Ibid, 245), one is hard-pressed to accept the notion that, when votes are equally distributed, candidates in a three-way election face the same level of competitiveness as their counterparts in a canonical two-way contest as suggested by their identical maximum value (1).
3 This built-in identi cation problem presents an estimation bias that needed to be reckoned with.
In sum, when vote distribution statistics are similar across elections, the ENC/N index tends to underestimate the competitiveness of elections having higher number of candidates due to N's larger diminishing marginal effect and when vote shares are perfectly equal among candidates, the index cannot distinguish the relative competitiveness among elections with different number of candidates. In the next section, we propose a remedy that alleviates these biases but retains N's desirable property.
A VARIANCE COMPONENT APPROACH
Drawing on the  ndings of these studies, we seek to correct the sensitivity issues that have plagued the previous indicators. Improving upon Kenig's ENC/N index, we address the confounding effect of the interaction between the number of candidates and the distribution of votes on competitiveness estimate through variance component approach. We then formulate a new composite indicator, the Electoral Competitiveness Indicator (ECI), with an aim toward providing a more  exible estimator that has the ability to assess competitiveness in a wide range of electoral contexts.
Our task is to  nd a feasible approach to scale down N's marginal effect without altering the diminishing effect it exerts on the ENC/N index through its interaction with !V i 2 . We want to achieve this without doing too much violence to Kenig's original ENC/N functional form since it attends appropriately to the interaction between N and !V i 2 . Our ECI is composed of two elements, an adjusted ENC indicator and a pooling factor, each with its speci c estimation purposes. The adjusted ENC indicator, shown in equation (1), dilutes the sensitivity issue by = 1 = using the square root of N in the speci cation; this speci cation also overcomes the identi cation problem caused by Kenig's upper bound normalization as this allows the indicator to vary with N. A simple solution is simply to take the square root of N and then plug it into the original formula:
Because shrinks the absolute value of N our adjusted ENC/N index is thus less sensitive to the marginal change in N. Also note that our Adj-ENC/N index will give a maximum value of when votes are equally distributed and this value is monotonically increasing in N. We regard our unbounded Adj to more faithfully capture the increasing level of competitiveness as a result of more equally-competitive candidates entering the race, as compared to the maximum value estimated by the ENC/N index which is unconditional on N.
Our attempt to propose electoral competitiveness indicator (ECI) does not stop here. Although the Adj marks an improvement over the original ENC/N index in terms of underestimation bias (for elections with large N) and identi cation problem, a competitiveness indicator is only useful when it can be used to evaluate the relative competitiveness of elections that have diverse vote distribution and number of candidates {!V i 2 , N} pro les. If the original ENC/N index works (partially)  ne only when the number of candidates is equal, we would like to extrapolate our analysis to instances that beyond this constraint. To this aim, an adjustment factor would be needed to offset the inherent downward bias imposed by the N term in our Adj indicator. Empirically, as N increases, it makes the distribution of votes less concentrated in major candidates which then causes the election to become more competitive; on the contrary, holding N constant, higher !V i 2 indicates that the distribution of votes is concentrated in a handful of candidates (i.e., large !V i 2 ), which makes the election less competitive. Clearly, two competing effects are at work in in uencing electoral competitiveness and their effects are translated through the vote distribution mechanism; however, this mechanism is poorly modeled by the speci cation of equation (1) because ENC/N is strictly decreasing in both !V i 2 and N. The question now comes down to how can we make more ef cient use of the information supplied by {!V i 2 , N} to improve our competitiveness estimates across cases having diverse N.
Ideally, we need an adjustment factor that can adjudicate the competing effects of !V i 2 and N on vote distribution and allow us to use this information to determine the proportion of the variance in electoral competitiveness that should be estimated by the estimator derived in (1). A useful  rst step toward the construction of such factor is to conceptualize the relationship between !V i 2 and N as that between variance and sample size n in a random effects model. Unlike classical regression analysis where the group-level predictors (! 1 ) and regression mean (") are collinear, 4 in a random effects model group-level predictors are shrunk toward their own estimated value (!# j ) for groups with more observation (n) and when within-group standard deviation (# j ) is small, but there is more pooling toward regression mean (") when the between-group standard deviation (# ! ) is small:
This same logic also applies electoral competitiveness analysis. An increase in smoothes out marginally the within-election (or between-candidate) vote share variance and shrinks the estimate toward this particular election's Adj value given by equation (1) ; on the contrary, higher !$ i 2 implies greater within-election vote share variance, which pools the estimate toward the mean estimate ( ). By expression (2), we can similarly de ne a pooling factor for election j with N candidates:
We then multiply expression (3) by equation (1) to denote the proportion of electoral competitiveness to be estimated by election j's unique Adj value, and let (1 -%) proportion of this competitiveness estimate to be pooled toward the mean estimate ( ). Adding these two parts together, we get a weighted competitiveness estimator, Electoral Competitiveness Indicator (ECI):
Clearly, this weighted estimator tends to attribute the original estimator (equation (1)) greater weight whenever N j is large but pools toward the election mean when !V ij 2 increases and these partial pooling effects are translated through the adjustment factor % because > 0 and < 0.
How does the ECI work? We now turn to instances when the elections being compared have different number of candidates. The comparison of H 1 to H 3 highlights the ability of the ECI to detect the marginal increase in competitiveness made by the presence of one fringe candidate (V 5 ) in H 3 , the ECI gives a higher competitiveness estimate for H 3 through more pooling toward its election mean ( , which is higher than H 1 's ( )) despite its having lower Adj score than that of H 1 . Also, when two more fringe candidates were present and absorb a small share of the vote away from the strongest candidate (V 1 ), thus narrowing the vote margin between the two leading candidates (V 1 and V 2 ), a situation typi ed by scenario H 4 , our ECI correctly delivers a higher competitiveness score for H 4 against the baseline scenario H 1 as compared to the estimates obtained by using the ENC/N index in Table 1 which incorrectly gives election H 1 higher competitiveness estimate (0.957854) than H 4 (0.669882). Finally, we look at election H 5 to H 6 , our analysis shows that even under perfectly equal vote share scenario, our ECI still outperforms Kenig's ENC/N. ECI assigns higher score to elections with larger number of candidates (N) as opposed to the ENC/N index which is invariant to the marginal change in N when the index is evaluated at its maximum value. This brief analysis persuasively demonstrates the  exibility and improved precision of our proposed variance component-based estimator in comparing competitiveness of electoral contests with unequal N.
DISCUSSION
This paper proposes a new measurement of electoral competitiveness between candidates running for single posts. In doing so, it re-evaluates extant electoral competitiveness measures through simulations and, by tackling the sensitivity and identi cation issues that have plagued previous studies, we develop a new estimator, ECI. This is robust to the confounding in uence of the interaction between the number of candidates and their vote shares. In that respect, our indicator improves the estimation precision of previously developed measures (Kenig 2009 ) through more ef cient use of vote distribution information; it is  exible enough to provide precise comparative competitiveness estimates across elections with varying number and strength of candidates. ECI overcomes the methodological problems of the previous measures and proposes a generally valid indicator. This accuracy appears to come at the cost of simplicity as the calculations are slightly more complex than the existing formulas. To compensate for the somewhat technical explanations within the text, Appendix 1 is meant to increase the accessibility of more users and explains how the indicator can be computed.
While the methodological implications of the ECI have been clearly outlined in the body of the paper, it provides at least three major empirical bene ts. First, the ECI is a universal measure for competitiveness in various electoral competitions for a single elected position. It is not sensitive to time or place and allows comparability of a broad range of electoral contests. At the same time, it provides a standardized measure that allows comparability of results across units of analysis over time. On these grounds, the second empirical implication is that ECI can be used in a variety of studies ranging from the electoral competitions (e.g. of candidates in single-member districts, for presidential elections) to leadership positions in organizations (i.e. political parties, administration, civil society etc.). Third, it enhances the processes of replication and reliability control. Researchers can use the ECI to take a retrospective look at various elections and evaluating their level of competitiveness.
APPENDIX: HOW TO CALCULATE THE ECI

Operationalization
To impute the ECI, we need the results of the electoral contests, the number of effective candidates (N), and we have to normalize each candidate's vote share (V i ) between 0 and 1. To express this concept formally, assuming there are N candidates i = 1, 2, 3,…, n, and N > 0, and each candidate receives V i 's of total vote in a particular election where:
5 and ! 1 n V i = 1.
Computing the ECI
The adjusted ENC/N index
This "adjusted" index measures the competitiveness of an election. As noted in the paper, we want this measure to be able to capture the increasing competitiveness resulting from more candidates entering the race without this positive effect being overtly diluted by the N term in the denominator. To alleviate N's larger marginal effect (relative to ! 1 n V i 2 ), we use the square root of N in the speci cation and operationalize our adjusted ENC/N index as
Note that the adjusted ENC/N index is less sensitive to the marginal change in N because the square root scales down the marginal effect of N. This operationalization procedure has desirable property in the sense that when votes are equally distributed among candidates, as we illustrated in the comparison of scenario H 5 and H 6 in the paper, speci cation allows the interactive denominator term, * ! 1 n V i 2 , to vary according to changes in N and vote shares distribution among candidates. This overcomes the identi cation problem that plagued Kenig's ENC/N index.
The pooling factor
Another methodological contribution of this study is that we extend the assessment of electoral competitiveness beyond cases with the same number of candidates. We want to re-emphasize here that there are two competing effects at work in in uencing electoral competitiveness. An increase in N  attens vote distribution, causing elections to be more competitive while higher !V i 2 makes vote distribution more concentrated, indicating less electoral competitiveness. As we argued in the paper, this mechanism is poorly modeled by the original ENC/N index and the speci cation of expression (1) since Adj is decreasing in both !V i 2 and . To extrapolate our analysis beyond this constraint would require an adjustment factor to offset the downward bias imposed by the N term without discarding useful "competitiveness" information (i.e., relative vote share among candidates) contained in the interaction term, * ! 1 n V i 2 . We  rst need to construct a pooling factor to partial out the vote share variances associated with an election's (say, election j) unique vote share pattern !V ij 2 from the expected vote share variance of an election with N effective candidates which is simply this the mean value, (i.e., when each candidate receives equal vote share, V 1 = V 2 = … = V n = , and is unconditional on the value and the distribution of V i ). As we have elucidated in our paper, we use N j and !V ij 2 to approximate the effective number of candidates and within-election vote share variance in election j, respectively. We then operationalize the pooling factor % as:
.
Where % determines the amount of vote share variance that are deviated from the expected mean estimate and which should be estimated by election-speci c competitiveness estimate, Adj . By (1) and (3), we now specify our ECI as a weighted estimator:
where is the expected vote share variance which is calculated from = , by (1) and given condition that V 1 = V 2 = … = V n = . Note that because = > 0 and = < 0, % is increasing in N j but decreasing in ! 1 n V ij 2 , a larger effective candidate size, N, pools the ECI estimate toward the adjusted ENC/N index, while a larger within-+ election vote share variance, !V ij 2 , makes a less precise competitive estimator and therefore pools the ECI toward the since the computation of the latter does not depend on the information of !V ij 2 .
Application
Now consider the six hypothetical election scenarios from We  rst square the V i value in each column and sum them together to obtain the vote share variance for each hypothetical election scenario, !V ij 2 for j = 1 to 6.We get: We now compute the relevant statistics required to estimate %. First we use the information given in each election scenario' {N j , !V ij 2 } to obtain their and (which equals N 2 ). We then use these statistics to calculate %, which is simply the ratio of to the sum of and by expression (3).
